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Spinoﬀs ﬁrms are an important source of industry dynamics and innovation.
While an emerging body of literature identiﬁes strategic disagreements and ideas as
determinants of spinoﬀs, neither of them can completely explain the spinoﬀ process.
Mere disagreements or brilliant ﬂashes of ideas do not always lead to spinoﬀs. This
study brings individual level determinants at the forefront in spinoﬀ formation.
Based on insights from the occupational choice theory, we argue that spinoﬀ process
is a distinctive class of entrepreneurial entrants and entrepreneurial talent is a major
determinant in formation of spinoﬀs. Entrepreneurial talent modulates the impact
of strategic disagreements and ideas on the decision to spinoﬀ.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D00, J24, L2
Keywords: Spinoﬀs, Entrepreneurship, Occupational choice, Disagreements
1 Introduction
Firms that are formed by ex-employees, the spinoﬀs, are very successful and constitute a
signiﬁcant proportion of new entrants across industries such as auto (Klepper, 2002), tire
(Buenstorf and Klepper, 2005), modern semiconductors (Brittain and Freeman, 1986),
disk drive (Franco and Filson, 2006; Agarwal et al., 2004) and the laser (Klepper and
Sleeper, 2005).1
∗I would like to thank David Audretsch, Guido Buenstorf, Uwe Cantner, Michael Dahl, Marco Guer-
zoni, Mark Sanders and Jagannadha Pawan Tamvada for their helpful comments and suggestions. I
would also like to thank participants at Max Planck IISC conference, 2007, Druid winter PhD con-
ference, 2008, Schumpeter conference, 2008, and Jena Economc Research workshop, 2007. The usual
disclaimer applies. Contact details: Graduate College “The Economics of Innovative Change” and En-
trepreneurship, Growth and Public policy group, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany.
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1In this paper, we refer spinoﬀs as ﬁrms founded by ex employees of some ﬁrm in the industry with
no connection with the parent ﬁrm.
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One body of literature identiﬁes strategic disagreements (Klepper and Thompson, 2006)
as the root cause behind spinoﬀs. Another body of literature discusses quality of ideas
(Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg, 2007) as a driver for spinoﬀs. However, it is observed
from many spinoﬀ examples that disagreements and ideas do not always lead to spinoﬀs;
nor are all spinoﬀs caused by disagreements or ideas. This leads to two important ques-
tions: First, amongst those employees who have disagreements or brilliant ideas, why do
only some choose the spinoﬀ trajectory? Second, is a spinoﬀ ﬁrm’s performance linked
to the founder employee’s reason of leaving the parent ﬁrm?
This paper goes to the root of the spinoﬀ process and bring individual ability into the
discussion on spinoﬀs to examine why some employees choose to spinoﬀ while others do
not. A compelling body of occupational choice literature suggests that entrepreneurial
choice is not independent of individual characteristics. In particular, personal character-
istics such as risk aversion (Kihlstrom and Laﬀont, 1979; van Praag and Cramer, 2001),
optimism (Fraser and Greene, 2006) and entrepreneurial ability (Lucas, 1978; van Praag
and Cramer, 2001) inﬂuence the decision of selecting into entrepreneurship.
In this paper, we propose that individual’s entrepreneurial talent is a major determi-
nant of the spinoﬀ process. Entrepreneurial talent is referred as all the characteristics
required for entrepreneurial activity. Following Ferrante (2005), we deﬁne entrepreneurial
talent as the ability to discover, select, process, interpret and use the data necessary to
take decisions in an uncertain world and to exploit market opportunities. The main fac-
tors aﬀecting this ability are innate traits like creativity, imagination, degree of risk aver-
sion, alertness and competence acquired through formal education (codiﬁed knowledge)
as well as through job experience. The secondary element is tacit knowledge embedded
in the environment available to the individual.
This paper proposes that private information of entrepreneurial talent acts as a cata-
lyst in making employees spinoﬀ. Employees may spinoﬀ even in the absence of disagree-
ments with employer or new ideas. Conversely, every employee who has a disagreement
with employer or a new idea may not necessarily spin oﬀ. Thus existing theories of
spinoﬀs who observe the role of disagreements and ideas alone cannot explain the spinoﬀ
process completely. It is in this context that the role of individual characteristics that
enable employees in occupational decision making have been ignored. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to assert the role of individual characteristics for the
spinoﬀ process.
In the model developed here, given disagreements or ideas employees make decisions
based on their entrepreneurial talent. Spinoﬀs are founded by employees who have en-
trepreneurial talent above a threshold value. New ideas or disagreements pull this thresh-
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An important result in this paperis the link between the event that triggers the spin oﬀ
and the resulting spinoﬀ ﬁrm’s quality. Spinoﬀs that are founded based on new ideas
have the highest quality in terms of equilibrium ﬁrm size.
The next section reviews existing literature on disagreements and ideas in the context
of spinoﬀs and discusses the missing role of entrepreneurial talent in the current literature.
The third section presents a simple model of spinoﬀ. The fourth section presents results
from analysis. The last section presents conclusions.
2 Strategic Disagreements and Ideas
A growing theoretical literature on spinoﬀs attempts to address why spinoﬀs emerge and
which type of ﬁrms spawn spinoﬀs. A prominent theory of strategic disagreements by
Klepper and Thompson (2006) argues that the strategic disagreements with employer
lead employees to spinoﬀs. Spinoﬀs occur when employees disagree suﬃciently from their
employers and are ready to bear the cost of forming new ﬁrms. Klepper and Thomp-
son (2006) argue that various cases of spinoﬀs in automobile, semiconductors and lasers
are explainable by theory of strategic disagreements. However, strategic disagreements
seem to provide an incomplete explanation for spinoﬀ process as indeed not all disagree-
ments lead to spinoﬀs and not all spinoﬀs are caused by strategic disagreements. An
employee may spinoﬀ without having any disagreement with employer if he considers
his entrepreneurial talent high enough to be an entrepreneur. For talented individuals,
entrepreneurship is a viable option to utilize human capital acquired over career life cy-
cle. Ford’s ﬁrst leading spinoﬀ, Hupp Motor company, was formed by Robert Hupp who
initially worked for Olds motor works as assistant superintendent at Ford always aspired
to be an entrepreneur. Spinoﬀ ﬁrms are distinctive class of entrepreneurial entrants and
the role of entrepreneurial talent has been ignored for spinoﬀ process till now.
Hellmann (2007) suggests that when employees get new ideas they face tradeoﬀ be-
tween continuing on their tasks or exploring new ideas. On one hand, a good idea may give
greater returns than wage employment. On the other hand, pursing an idea externally is
risky and involves forgoing a secure wage employment. Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg
(2007) propose a new theory of ﬁrm dynamics where private information about the mean
returns of ideas leads to an adverse selection problem in which the best ideas give a worker
incentives to set up new ﬁrms. Employees reveal ideas to their employer but if the idea
is very good then they leave wage employment to start their own ﬁrms. Thus, the best
ideas result in spinoﬀs and not so good ideas are sold to existing ﬁrms. Moreover, Friebel
and Giannetti (2009) suggest that employee’s expected loss increases when an idea has a
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of ideas in decision to spinoﬀ to the fore. However, a question still remains if good quality
ideas are suﬃcient for the formation of spinoﬀs and if spinoﬀs decisions are independent
of individuals’ entrepreneurial traits.
2.1 The Role of Entrepreneurial Talent in Spinoﬀs
Generation and implementation of ideas are two aspects that drive change. En-
trepreneurial insights do not always translate into entrepreneurial action. Shane (2000)
argues that discovery of an opportunity is a necessary condition for entrepreneurship but
it is not a suﬃcient condition. After the recognition of an idea, a potential entrepreneur
must decide to exploit the idea. Spinoﬀ process is an example of getting entrepreneurial
insights and realizing them.
From the existing theories of spinoﬀs (Klepper and Thompson, 2006; Chatterjee and
Rossi-Hansberg, 2007) it is apparent that some employees decide to spinoﬀ when they
either disagree with their employer or when they posses high quality ideas that give them
enough motivation to ﬁnd their own ﬁrm. But their own entrepreneurial capabilities
which make them spinoﬀ after disagreement with their employer or recognition of a new
idea have been undermined. On the one hand, if some employee has a very good idea
but does not believe that he has the calibre to implement it in the market, he would not
spinoﬀ. He would either try to sell his idea to his employer or just drop it. On the other
hand, if an employee disagrees with his employer, unless he believes on his entrepreneurial
capabilities, he would not leave a secured wage employment to set up his own venture.
When an employee switches to entrepreneurship, he leaves his secured income and em-
ployment to try new ideas in an uncertain world. Occupational choice literature suggests
that individuals compare the relative reward structure of occupations given their capabil-
ities (Lucas, 1978). Some individuals have a comparative advantage in entrepreneurship
and have higher entrepreneurial talents. In Lucas (1978), managers are endowed with
diﬀerent talents for managing and this plays a crucial role in the allocation of the work-
force among them. Talent for managing enters the production function as an additional
another factor of production whose price is determined by the interaction of supply and
demand. Talent has a huge impact on output as it acts as a multiplier in production
function. The individual’s talent determines the choice of an individual to be a worker or
an entrepreneur. Following this literature we argue that the role of individual talent in
spinoﬀ process is very important. Entrepreneurial talent together with the disagreement
or possession of a new idea determines who may spinoﬀ.
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Employees are heterogeneous in their entrepreneurial talent. Every employee has private
information of his ET. There is no screening device so there is asymmetric information
between employer and employee regarding employee’s entrepreneurial talent. Employees
are homogeneous in terms of productivity thus they receive wages independent of their
ET.2 We assume a perfectly elastic supply of capital, labor and entrepreneurs organize
only labor and analyze a one period decision making by an employee to switch from wage
employment to entrepreneurship based on private information of his ET, disagreement
with the ﬁrm’s management or having a new idea. Let S = (ψ1,,,,,ψn,,,,) be a technol-
ogy set whose elements are ordered by low to high returns. This technology set consists
of those technologies that are used by existing entrepreneurs.3
Employee’s problem: An employee with talent τi has disutility of being a worker
denoted by g(τi). Here g is a monotonically increasing function of τi and g(0) = 0.
The disagreements with employer cause additional disutility when working in that ﬁrm.
Thus, the utility of an employee, ui = f(w,τi,Di), is a function of his wage (w), the
entrepreneurial talent (τi) and his disagreement with employer (Di). The utility function
of the employee is ui= w − g(τi) in the absence of any disagreement. In the presence of
a disagreement with employer, the utility is ui= w − g(τi) − Di.
Entrepreneur’s problem: An entrepreneur with ET τ who owns ﬁrm i imple-
ments technology ψi and employs labor L. The entrepreneur’s optimization problem
is Πi = τ.ψi.Lγ − w.L. γ is the returns to scale of production process (decreasing i.e
0 < γ < 1). First order condition gives optimal labor L∗ = ( w
τ.ψi.γ)1/γ−1
Spinoﬀ Criteria for an employee: At the end of period, employee faces four
possibilities :
Case 1: No disagreement: An employee with entrepreneurial talent τi, without a





∗ = w − τi (1)
The employee will spinoﬀ if he ﬁnds a technology such that ui < E(uent) = E(Πi), that
is, if
2This assumption, though is a limitation, is usual in literature (Lucas, 1978; Prescott, 2003; van Praag
and Cramer, 2001).
3 New technology and a new idea is used synonymously in remaining text. The technology set may
be related to the stage of industry life cycle (ILC). For example, in immature phase of industry life cycle,
this set will be of high cardinality as many diﬀerent technologies are implemented by entrepreneurs.
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∗ =
w(1 + L∗)
1 + ψi(L∗)γ (2)
if As Figure 1 shows, if ui = E(Πi), then an individual is indiﬀerent between staying in
the ﬁrm and becoming an entrepreneur.4
Case 2: Disagreement: If the employee has some disagreement with his employer on
issues such as business strategy of ﬁrm, acquisition, change in the organization structure,
or change of CEO.5 The disagreement causes a disutility Di of working in the ﬁrm. Thus,
employee’s utility of working in the ﬁrm becomes:
ui = w − g(τi) − Di (3)
As employee has some disagreement with the employer but does not have a new idea, he
may spinoﬀ by replicating his ﬁrm’s technology or some similar technology.





w(1 + L∗) − Di
1 + ψi(L∗)γ (4)
As Figure 2 shows, if ui = E(uent), then an employee is indiﬀerent between staying in
the ﬁrm and becoming an entrepreneur.
Case 3: New Idea: When an employee gets a new idea while working in the ﬁrm,
let us say, this new idea increments some existing technology which can be referred
as an idea premium and takes the form ψi + Ii. The production function becomes,
Πi = τ.(ψi + Ii).(L∗)γ − w.L∗, where L∗ is now the optimal labor for new idea. The
employee may or may not reveal the idea to the employer. This leads to two possible
cases.
a) Employee does not reveal idea to the employer : The new idea brings additional
expected proﬁt. The utility as an entrepreneur increases by Ii. Now expected proﬁt to
switch to entrepreneurship is Πi = τi.(ψi + Ii).(L∗)γ − w.L∗. Thus, an employee with a





1 + (ψi + Ii)(L∗)γ (5)
b) Disagreement with employer because of new idea : The employer is assymetrically
informed about the ET of employee and may be unable to properly assess the idea quality.
4For the calculation of thresholds refer to the appendix.
5Assuimg that every disagreement is of intensity Di.
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to a disagreement. With disagreement, utility of staying in the ﬁrm is ui = w−g(τi)−Di.





w(1 + L∗) − Di
1 + (ψi + Ii)(L∗)γ (6)
then the employee will spinoﬀ. However, if the employer accepts the idea and oﬀers a
new wage to the employee, the employee would continue in the ﬁrm if his expected proﬁt
from the new idea is less than or equal to the new wage oﬀered by the employer. In case
of an oﬀer of higher wage by the employer, the utility of employee to stay in the ﬁrm
becomes ui = wnew − g(τi), and even then if ui < E(Πi), then the employee will spinoﬀ.
4 Results
The following propositions synthesize the analysis and explain when employees spinoﬀ
and how disagreements and ideas eﬀect the spinoﬀ process in addition to entrepreneurial
talent. The analysis further shows the link between the event of disagreement or idea
and spinoﬀ ﬁrm quality.
Proposition 1: Spinoﬀ ﬁrms are started by employees who have entrepreneurial tal-
ent above the threshold given by the indiﬀerence condition, holding technology constant.
The threshold level of ET for a given technology is the level of talent where an em-
ployee is indiﬀerent between staying in the ﬁrm and the entrepreneurial option. From
Equation 2, Equation 4, Equation 5, Equation 6, employees whose ET is greater than
threshold entrepreneurial talent are likely to spinoﬀ. There are diﬀerent threshold levels
of entrepreneurial talent in diﬀerent cases. The potential spinoﬀs are employees with ET,
τi ≥ τ∗.
Proposition 2: The threshold level of ET with disagreement, τ∗
D, is lower than
threshold without disagreement, τ∗, holding technology constant.




without disagreement, the threshold is τ∗ =
w(1+L∗)
1+ψi(L∗)γ. As τ∗
D < τ∗, a disagreement with
the employer makes an employee more likely to spinoﬀ. An individual who is indiﬀerent
or better oﬀ as an employee without disagreement, may be better oﬀ as entrepreneur
after a disagreement.
Proposition 3: A new idea pulls the threshold level of entrepreneurial talent to the
left.
With a new idea, the indiﬀerence condition becomes τ.(ψi + Ii).(L∗)γ − w.L∗ = w −
g(τi). Now a higher expected proﬁt by spinning oﬀ is compared to the utility of continuing
7
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becomes better oﬀ as an entrepreneur with a new idea. The threshold of ET when
employee does not reveal the idea, is τ∗
I =
w(1+L∗)
1+(ψi+Ii)(L∗)γ. If employee reveals idea to the
employer but employer disagrees with employee, the threshold of ET becomes, τ∗
ID =
w(1+L∗)−Di
1+(ψi+Ii)(L∗)γ. Both threshold levels, τ∗
I and τ∗
ID are to the left of τ∗
i .
Proposition 4: An employee may spinoﬀ even in the absence of a new idea or
disagreement.
The employees who have high ET according to their own private information face
disutility of just being an employee. In the absence of new ideas such employees may
replicate the parent ﬁrm’s technology or some technology in the neighborhood of the par-
ent ﬁrm. This observation may explain a well known empirical regularity about spinoﬀs
that not all the spinoﬀ ﬁrms pursue new ideas, but still are good performers.6
Proposition 5: An individual with new idea is more likely to spinoﬀ if he reveals
the idea to the employer and faces a rejection from the employer.
If employee reveals his idea to the employer, one possibility is that employer rejects
the idea, another possibility is that employer approves the idea but oﬀers wage or
bonus lesser than what the employee expects. In both cases there is disagreement
with the employer, and the disutility caused by disagreement gives the threshold
τ∗
D (see Equation 4). If the employee does not reveal the idea, he would not have a
disagreement with the employer. The threshold is τ∗
ID < τ∗
I , holding technology constant.7
Result 1: The order of thresholds of ET in various cases is, τ∗
ID < τ∗




An employee who does not have any disagreement with his employer or a new idea has
a higher threshold of ET to spinoﬀ than employees who have a disagreement with their
employer or a new idea. This shows that employees are more likely to spinoﬀ in case of
disagreements or new ideas. As ideas and disagreements bring the threshold level of ET
down, an individual who was better oﬀ as an employee in the absence of disagreement or
idea may become better oﬀ as an entrepreneur in the presence of disagreements or new
ideas. Interestingly, the order of thresholds shows that an employee is most likely to spin
oﬀ when he faces both an idea and a disagreement compared to the presence of either of
an idea or a disagreement.
6many spinoﬀ ﬁrms replicate parent ﬁrm’s technology (Bhide, 1994).
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To spinoﬀ, an individual must have optimal utility level as an entrepreneur to be higher or
equal to the optimal utility as an employee. A disagreement with an employer brings down
the utility of being an employee and threshold to spin oﬀ comes down(see Equation 4).
Any technology which gives expected returns atleast equal to this depreciated utility of
being in the ﬁrm can be implemented by the employee to spin oﬀ. As a disagreement
depreciates the utility as an employee, lesser utility level as an entrepreneur is required
to switch to entrepreneurship in case of a disagreement. Spinoﬀs in such contexts may
be only self employers and not the spinoﬀs in the legacy of "the innovators".
From Figure 2, a new idea leads to an increase in the expected proﬁt by the idea
premium. This higher level of utility to become an entrepreneur with a new idea is
compared to the utility of being an employee. By putting threshold τ∗
D in utility function
of employee with disagreement, we get U∗
D. Similarly by putting τ∗
I in utility function
with idea, we get U∗
I. Putting threshold without disagreement and idea τ∗ in utility
function gives U∗. From Figure 2, we see that U∗
D < U∗ and U∗ < U∗
I. Thus, an employee
who spins oﬀ because of a new idea would found better spinoﬀ ﬁrm than employee who
spin oﬀ only because of disagreements with employer.
Result 2: The spinoﬀ ﬁrm quality is highest when employee spins oﬀ because of
new idea. The spinoﬀ ﬁrm quality is lowest when employee spins oﬀ only because of
disagreement with employer.
Following from the analysis above, U∗
D < U∗ < U∗









DI lies left or right of U∗, depends on the intensity of D and I. If I is large
and D is small, it will lie on the right of U∗, or other way around, if I is too low and D
is too high. Thus, a spinoﬀ ﬁrm based on a new idea has highest quality while a spinoﬀ
ﬁrm based on only disagreements has lowest size. The spinoﬀ ﬁrm founded because of an
idea and disagreement has higher quality than spinoﬀ ﬁrm based on disagreements but
lower quality than a spinoﬀ ﬁrm based on new ideas.
The analysis shows that τ∗
D < τ∗ and τ∗
I < τ∗; thus, both the thresholds of disagree-
ment or idea are to the left of τ∗. Whether τ∗
D< τ∗
I or vice versa, depends on the relative
intensity of idea and disagreement. If τ∗
I > τ∗
D , it means that disagreement is of higher
intensity than new idea.8 It is observable that L∗(τ∗
I ) > L∗(τ∗
D). This suggests that if
disagreement is drive behind spinoﬀ ﬁrm, it tends to be of lower size that spinoﬀ ﬁrm
founded based on new idea.
If τ∗
D> τ∗
I , idea is of higher intensity than disagreement. In this case, it can be seen
8 In other words, when an employee has a new idea, he still is better oﬀ as an employee but when he
has a disagreement, he becomes better oﬀ as an entrepreneur.
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D < 1. This suggests that when new idea, ψi + Ii is
a radical idea or very distinct from old technology ψi, then the spinoﬀ ﬁrm from this
new idea will be of higher size than spinoﬀ ﬁrm founded becaouse of disagreement even
though threshold level of talent from disagreement is higher.
4.2 Cummulative Disagreement
Let us assume that disagreement with the employer has a cummulative eﬀect during
employment span of an employee in a ﬁrm. Proposition 2 suggests that a disagreement
moves the threshold to the left. Thus the ﬁrst disagreement moves the threshold to the
left, the second disagreement moves it further left and so on. Thus continuous disagree-
ment leads to lim τ∗
D → 0. If employee does not spinoﬀ after ﬁrst disagreement as his
τi < τ∗
D, second disagreement moves the threshold to further left, say τ∗
DD. If again,
τi < τ∗
DD, employee is still better oﬀ working in the ﬁrm. However further disagreements
may bring employee at the threshold or above the threshold and make him a potential
spinoﬀ.
Result 3: Continous disagreements may drive even a low talented employee to spin
oﬀ.
Assuming that nth disagreement has the same negative eﬀect on individual’s utility
of working in the ﬁrm. Continuous disagreements lead to a signiﬁcantly lower level of
threshold level of talent and utility of working in the ﬁrm and thus much lower expected
proﬁt in outside option is required to spinoﬀ. Thus several disagreements with employer
may drive any employee to spinoﬀ and then spinoﬀ ﬁrm may not be of high quality.
4.3 Common Knowledge of Average Entrepreneurial Talent
The information of entrepreneurial talent of other existing entrepreneurs in industry
can act as a refernce point and deterrent factor in spinoﬀ process. Assume that the
distribution of ET of existing entrepreneurs is unknown but the average ET is common
knowledge. An employee has private information of his own ET and the average ET.
The distance of his ET from the known average ET in the industry is a factor in utility
maximization. The utility function becomes ui = w − g(τi − τa). If individual’s ET is
below τa then utility as an employee is higher than when ET is below τa. With common
knowledge of average entrepreneurial talent of other entrepreneurs, the thresholds of ET in
cases of disagreement, ideas, idea and disagreement change accordingly, for example, the




it was τ∗ =
w(1+L∗)
1+ψi(L∗)γ. Thus, with common knowledge of average ET, the thresholds to
spinoﬀ are higher than the thresholds without common knowledge. The talents of existing
10
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5 Conclusion
Various theories in spinoﬀ process (Klepper and Thompson, 2006; Chatterjee and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2007) have proposed the causes for spinoﬀ process as strategic disagreements
and new ideas. The literature on occupational choice strongly suggests that a switch
from one occupation to another is based on individual characteristics. This paper fo-
cuses on this individual level process to study spinoﬀ process and argues that individual
characteristics can not be ignored when explaining who spins oﬀ. Based on insights from
the occupational choice literature, this paper suggests that in the spinoﬀ process, private
information of individual’s entrepreneurial talent plays an important role. An employee
whose entrepreneurial talent is at or above threshold value of entrepreneurial talent may
spinoﬀ in the absence of any disagreements or new ideas. On the contrary, an employee
who has a disagreement with the employer, a new idea, or both, may not spinoﬀ, if his
entrepreneurial talent is lower than the threshold. Thus the analysis presented in the
paperexplains who will spinoﬀ given disagreements with employer and/or new ideas and
why all employees do not leave in the presence of strategic disagreements or new ideas.
The employees who are at or above the threshold level of ET are more likely to spinoﬀ.
The employee becomes more likely to spinoﬀ when he faces disagreement with employer
or gets new idea.
The analysis gives insights about the quality of spinoﬀs generated in diﬀerent contexts.
A spinoﬀ ﬁrm founded because of new idea has the highest ﬁrm quality. In particular,
comparison of thresholds of idea and disagreement gives insights about the size of spinoﬀ
ﬁrms generated due to an idea or disagreement. A spinoﬀ ﬁrm whose founder is driven
to spinoﬀ by a disagreement than a new idea, will be of smaller size than the spinoﬀ ﬁrm
based on new idea. The results further suggest that when a radical idea is the driver
behind spinoﬀ formation, the size of such spinoﬀ ﬁrm will be larger than spinoﬀ ﬁrm
based on disagreement.
The analysis answers another empirical regularity in spinoﬀ literature: change in
ownership or acquisition increases spinoﬀ rates. Indeed, ownership change, merger or
acquisition lead to a change in the working environment in a ﬁrm which may lead to
several possibilities of disagreement(s) between an employee and employer. The analysis
shows that an individual with lower ET may also spinoﬀ because of cummulative dis-
agreements with his employer over time. Thus, if the drive to found a ﬁrm is rooted in
severe disagreement(s) with employer, spinoﬀ ﬁrm’s performance is questionable. In an
environment where individuals have information about average ET of entrepreneurs in
11
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talent may act as a more deterring factor in the spinoﬀ process. This paper provided
new insights into the spinoﬀ process and laid foundations for compelling questions to be
answered such as the comparison of quality of spinoﬀ ﬁrms who are known to be founded
primarily because their founder had disagreements with their employer with the spinoﬀ
ﬁrms whose founder did not have any disagreement with his employer.
12
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 059Figure 1: Entrepreneurial Talent and Marginal Employee
Figure 2: Entrepreneurial Talent and Spinoﬀs (Disagreement and New Idea)
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Threshold τ∗
i without no idea and disagreement: Assuming that g(τi) = τi. The condition










D in case of disagreement: When there is a disagreement, the condition










I when employee has a new idea and do not reveal: When an employee











ID, when employee has a new idea, reveals to the employer and employer
rejects the idea: When an employee has an idea and do reveal it to the employer and










I in case of new idea and acceptance of idea by the employer by oﬀering
higher wage: When an employee has an idea and do reveal it to the employer. Employer
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